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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is an investigation of the question of the 
probative force of the syllogism. It examines on what the 
probative force of propositions constituting an arqument 
depends and some of the cases in which the conclusion of a 
syllogism is and is not proven by the premises. 
The investigation begins by looking at certain pre-
liminary notions associated with arguments in qeneral and 
categorical syllogisms in particular. In each cateqorical 
syllogism are found two claims. One is the claim to truth 
made by each proposition, and another is the claim to validity 
made by the syllogism. Hhen each of these claims are fulfilled 
the syllogism is then sound. The question is whether or not 
every sound syllogism also represents a proof of the conclusion. 
John Stuart Mill asserted that no deductive arqument 
including the syllogism can be a proof of the truth of the 
conclusion on the grounds that the premises presuppose the 
conclusion. In fact each syllogism is an example of the 
fallacy of petitio principii which it must by its very nature 
corruni t. 
Alexander Pfander instead claimed that only in certain 
cases is the conclusion not proven by the premises, while in 
other cases the truth of the conclusion is actually proven by 
ii 
the truth of the prem1ses. 
An independent investigation of the question of the probative 
force of the syllogism is made. Because of a crucial difference 
between propositions affirming contingent states of fact and 
essentially necessary propositions affirminq necessary states of 
fact, it is shown that no syllogism containing contingent 
propositions can be a proof, while a proof is present in the case 
of a syllogism containing essentially necessary propositions. When 
the propositions of an argument are continqent their truth follows 
from the fact each particular existing instance they refer to 
actually has what is affirmed by the proposition. Therefore, if 
the syllogism is valid, the conclusion will refer to at least some 
of the same particular existing instances on which the truth of 
each of the premises depends. The premises can be true only if the 
conclusion is true, and any uncertainty about the truth of the 
conclusion extends also to the premises. The premises cannot prove 
the truth of the conclusion since their truth presupposes the 
truth of the conclusion. 
Propositions which are essentially necessary are true re-
gardless of whether or not any particular instance exists or will 
ever exist. Because the state of fact is essentially necessary, 
the predicate is intelligibly grounded necessarily in the subject. 
If these kinds of propositions are found in a syllogism, their 
truth will not depend on the truth of a conclusion. Essentially 
necessary propositions have probative force, and their presence in 
a valid argument results in an actual proof of the conclusion. 
iii 
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CHAPTER I 
PRELIMINARY EMARKS ON THE NATURE OF SYLLOGISTIC 
ARGUMENT A TI ON 
Deductive argumentation: 
An argument is a collection of propositions related in such a 
way that the truth of one of them is said to follow from the truth 
of the remaining propositions which may number one or more than one. 
The proposition which is said to follow from one or more other 
propositions is called the conclusion of the argument while the 
proposition(s) which the conclusion is said to follow from is called 
the premise(s). When it is said that the conclusion fol1ows from 
the premise or premises, this means that the latter attempt to pro-
vide evidence for the truth of the conclusion by their own truth 
through the logical form of the argument. Evidence may be provided 
for the truth of the conclusion in two general ways; either 
deductively or inductively. 
The difference between induction and deduction: 
In deductive argumentation, the manner of arqumentation, that 
is, the process whereby evidence is provided for the truth of a 
proposition is such that the · conclusion is claimed to follow 
necessarily from the truth of the premise or premises. However, in 
induction the manner of argumentation claims to yield a true 
conclusion which follows with a specific degree of probability and 
not with necessity. l The fact that the true conclusions of 
deductive arguments can follow necessarily from true premises 
while the true .conclusion of inductive arguments can never 
follow necessarily from true premises points to a fundamental 
difference in the way the premises are used as evidence for the 
conclusion. In deduction the process of argumentation proceeds 
from what is less general to what is more general. 2 A true con-
clusion could only follow necessarily from true premises if the 
relation between premises and the conclusion is from what is more 
general to what is of equal or less generality. Unless this were 
so, the conclusion would assert more than was given or provided 
for by the premises. This is precisely wh.at occurs iri the case of 
induction for the conclusion asserts more than was actually given 
by the premises. 
1There is a certain procedure in mathematics which is called in-
duction whereby one reasons from what is true in some cases to 
what is necessarily universally true. For example, one may rea-
son that since a specific feature belongs to some prime numbers, 
the feature therefore belongs necessarily to all prime numbers. 
The question of whether or not such a method is really induction 
or perhaps involves other procedures, and the question of what 
bearing the special nature of numbers and mathematical laws have 
on this issue is not crucial to this investigation. 
2 
Someone may object that induction can proceed from what is parti-
cular to~hat is also particular. One may reason that, for example, 
since one room of a house has no rug, and a second room has no rug, 
and still a third room has no rug, therefore, the fourth room will 
have no rug. However, the inference to the conclusion can only take 
place, in this case, based upon a general premise w~ich would be the 
result of the examination of the first three cases, and from which 
the claim regarding the unobserved case is inferred. Without a 
general premise the three observed cases could not be used as 
evidence for the fourth unobserved case. 
The difference in generality between the premises and the 
conclusion may consist in the quantification of the proposition, 
or in the generic relation between the terms of one proposition 
and the terms of another proposition. For example, if one talks 
about all of the furniture in the house an~ then about some of 
the furniture, then the former is more general than the latter 
because the quantifier II a 1111 is More genera 1 than the quantifier 
11some.11 If, on the other hand, one talks about all of the furniture 
in the house and then about all of the chairs then the former is 
more general than the latter since a chair represents only one kind 
of furniture. Therefore, if someone were to argue that since some 
of the chairs in the house are made of wood, then all of the chairs 
are made of wood, their conclusion would not follow necessarily be-
cause the . quantifier of the cone 1 us ion makes the proposition mor·e 
· genera 1 than. the premise. In the case, however, when someone argues 
that since all of the furniture in the house is made of wood and 
chairs are furniture in the house, then all of the chairs which are 
found in the house are made of wood, then the conclusion can follow 
necessarily; for the generic relation between the terms 11furniture 11 
and 11chair 11 is • from greater to lesser qenerality. 3 
These remarks should be sufficient to distinguish deduction 
from induction. 
The difference between immediate and mediate arquments: 
Immediate arguments differ from mediate ones in that in the 
3By general to particular in this context is not meant the rela-
tion of a proposition to actually existing particular instances of 
what is affirmed. This relation will be dealt with at length in a 
later section. 
3 
former the argument contains only one premise while in the latter 
the argument contains more than one premise. ·· The term II immediate" 
refers to the fact that the argument proceeds directly from one 
premise to the conclusion. The term "mediate" refers to the fact 
that the conclusion follows not simply from one premise or the 
other premise but from all · premises taken toqether. This paper 
will be concerned with one specific type of mediate deductive 
formal argument, namely, the categorical syllogism. 
The categorical syllogism4: 
A syllogism is one kind of deductive argument which consists 
of two premises and a conclusion. When all of the propositions 
constituting the syllogism are categorical propositions, the syllo-
gism is then a categorical syllogism. Categorical propositions are 
the simplest among the various different kinds of propositions. This 
is shown in the fact that a categorical proposition consists of and 
requires ·only a minimum of one subject concept, one predicate con-
cept, and a copula. Thus a categorical proposition differs from 
more complex propositions such as disjunctives and conjunctives 
which may themselves contain categorical propositions; and it 
differs also from propositions in which the copula is restrained in 
some way such as in conditionals. 
4The remarks which will now be made may certainly apply to 
other kinds of syllogisms besides categorical syllogisms. This 
investigation will be restricted to categorical syllogisms because 
of certain unique features which they possess, and because they 
are used by Mill in the context of his accusation aqainst 
deductive argumentation. · 
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The two-fold claim found in cateqorical syllogisms: 
The premises of categorical syllogisms claim to provide 
evidence for the truth of the conclusion in two different 
ways. Each of these claims must be fulfilled, otherwise the 
truth of the conclusion will not follow necessarily from the 
premises. 
The pr9position and its claim to truth: 
A proposition is to be differentiated from the mental or 
psychological act of judging, from the linguistic form which ex-
presses the proposition, and from the state of act which it asserts 
is the case. The act of jugging differs from the proposition in 
the following way. First, the act of judging is multiplied as the 
same proposition is communicated from person to person. Secondly~ 
one can predicate of propositions features which cannot be predica-
. ted of the act of judqinq like for example that a proposition can 
be communicated. The proposition differs from the linguistic ex-
pression first in the fact that the same proposition can be ex-
pressed by different linquistic expressions, like when a proposi-
tion is asserted in German and the same proposition is asserted in 
English or some other language. One can also predicate of a 
linguistic expression features which cannot be predicated of a 
proposition like that a·wo~d in a sentence is misspelled. 
Furthermore, a proposition differs from the above in that 
only propositions can be true or false. The proposition makes a 
claim to truth which consists in its affirming that a state of fact 
obtains. It lies in the very essence of a proposition that it make 
5 
this claim to truth. Truth and falsity are quite properly pre-
dicable only of propositions amonq the various other kinds of 
thoughts such as invitations, questions, commands, wishes, 
promises, etc. 
The claim to truth can be located in the copula of the 
propositions, for it is by the affirmino function of the copula 
that the state of fact is claimed to be. This is only one of two 
different functions found in the copula for its second function 
is to relate the predicate to the subject. It is by this rela-
tion function that someth-inq (the predicate) is predicated of 
something else (the subject). The affirminq function is found 
only in propositions while the relating function is found in all 
kinds of thoughts with the exception of simple concepts. 
Since the categorical sylloqism consists of propositions, 
as do all arguments, each of the prooositions make this claim to 
truth. In other words, the claim to truth is made by the premises 
and by the conclusion. 
One claim found in the syllogism then is the claim made by 
each proposition comprisinq the sylloqism that it is true. There 
is a further claim made by the syllogism, namely, its claim to be 
valid. 
The Claim of the syllogism to be valid: 
It lies in the essence of a cateqorical syllogism that it 
make a claim of validity; that is, it makes the claim that due 
to the logical relation between the premises and the conclusion,the 
0 
conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. 5 This loqical 
relation between the premises and the conclusion concerns the 
l oqi cal form of the syllogism and is independent from the 
question of the truth or falsity of the propositions. 6 There-
fore, . although a cateqorical sylloqism may be valid this does 
not imply that any of the propositions are true. When a categori-
cal . s.yllogism is valid the conclusion follows necessarily from the 
premises, but the truth of the conclusion need not also necessarily 
follow. This would require that the premises be true and the syllo-
gism be valid.This point will be explained in qreater detail in a 
moment. What is important to understand now is that when the con-
clusion of a valid argument follows necessarily from the premises 
this does not give any indication of the truth or falsity of the 
conclusion. To say that the conclusion of a valid argument follows 
necessarily refers to a logical relation of logical necessity be-
tween the premises and the conclusion. 
The question regarding the source of the claim of validity 
which the syllogism makes is an exceedingly difficult one to 
5The term 11valid 11 may be used in inductive arqumentation to 
refer to the fact that the conclusion follows with a degree of 
probability that warrants a reasonable assent. However, consi-
dering the fundamental difference existinq between this meaninq 
and its meanina within deductive arqumentation, the term 11valid 11 
will be used throughout this paper to refer to deductive argu-
ments in which the conclusion follows necessarily from the premi-
ses. 
6This is not to ignore arguments in which the conclusion 
follows necessarily from the premises not because of the form of 
the arguments but because of a material relation. Some of these 
material inferences are, for example, 11if A is equal to 811 then 
11B is equal to A11 ; or 11if A is earlier than 811 then "B is later 
than A. 11 
fully answer. To begin with, certain remarks about the consti-
tution of the syllogism must be made. A -categorical syllogism 
consists of three and only three categorical propositions. Two 
of the propositions are the premises and one is the conclusion. 
The predicate of the conclusion is called the major term and the 
subject of the conclusion is called the minor term. The middle 
term is one appearing in each of the premises but not in the 
conclusion. The premise which contains the major term is called 
the major premise and the premise which contains the minor term is 
called the minor premise. This means that in a categorical syllo-
gism, there wi 11 be three and only three terms each used twice in 
the manne~ just explained. 7 Thus, according to this explanation, 
the following two arguments would not be categorical syllogisms. 
All crows are black~ 
All dog~ have tails. 
All cats have fur. 
All crows are crows. 
All dogs are tats. 
All cats are dogs. 
Although the first argument consists of three categorical 
propositions it contains more than three terms. The second 
syllogism consists of three categorical propositions, and it con-
tains three terms each used twice; however, the middle term is 
not found in each of the premises, and neither does the major 
7The same claim is made by Freeman, Logic: The Art of 
Reasoni nq ( New York: David McKay Co., Inc. , 1967), p. 145. 
Also by Cqpi ~·Introduction to Logic, (New York: MacMillan Co., 
1972), p. 181. 
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term appear in one premise and the minor term in another. The 
following argument is a qenuine example of a cateqorical syllo-
gism. 
All crows are dogs. 
All crows are cats. 
All cats are dogs~ 
In this argument there are three categorical propositions, 
and three terms each used twice, and further, the middle term 
appears in each premise, and the major term is found in one pre-
mise while the minor term is found in theother premise. In this 
way the major term and the minor term are connected in the pre-
mises by means of the middle term. They are brought together, so 
to speak, or united by means of the middle term which occurs in 
both of them. 
It is with this structure of a categorical syllogism that 
its claim to validity can .be found. It is a claim that lies then 
in the formal nature of the categorical syllogism; that ;~ •it is a 
claim which stems from the relation of terms within three categori-
cal propositions. 8 Yet, to what exactly does the term 11validity 11 
refer? 
The concept 11validity 11 is one sui qeneris. It cannot be 
defined in the sense that it cannot be reduced to some other rela-
tion; nor can it be defined in a way which would enable a person, 
. ignorant of what validity is, to understand what it without simply 
apprehending it directly. The following argument is an example of 
8rhis is not to be confused with the question regarding upon 
whi.ch factors the validity of the syllogism depends. Such factors 
would deal with the quantity and quality of the categorical pro-
positions. 
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a valid categorical syllogism: 
All crows are dogs. 
All cats are crows. 
All cats are dogs. 
Although 11validity 11 cannot be defined, some of its features 
can of course be mentioned and some of the consequences of valid 
syllogisms can be po,nted out. One of the consequences of valid 
syllogisms is that if the premises are true then the conclusion 
must also necessarily be true. This does not mean that the pre-
mises are true or that they must be true but only that if they are 
true the conclusion must be true. This is a necessary consequence 
of the validity of the sylloqism, but it does not represent a de-
finition of validity. 
Another consequence following from the validity of a syllo-
gism is that if the conclusion is false at least one of the premises 
must also be false. This follows from· the fact that a valid syllo-
gism cannot have two true premises and a false conclusion. 
Because these are necessary consequences of a valid syllogism 
their absence entails that the syllogism is invalid. A syllogism 
which can have two true premises and a false conclusion cannot be 
valid and must be invalid. 9 
If an argument were to contain as a premise the very conclu-
sion of the argument, it would be quite true to say that if the 
premises are true then the conclusion must necessarily be true. 
This follows not from the valid form of the ariwment, but from the 
simple fact that the conclusion is itself a premise. Such a possi-
bility would seem to be ruled out in the case of a cateqcrical 
syllogism since such an argument, in having the conclusion as a pre-
mise, could not have three terms each used twice, etc. The conclu-
sion of a valid cateqorical sylloqism follows from both premises 
taken together. 
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Still another way the notion of validity can be revealed 
is by pointing out how the conclusion of a valid syllogism follows 
necessarily even though its premises and conclusion are false. 
This will be more fully analyzed in the following section dealing 
with the soundness of the syllogism. 
The soundness of the syllogism: 
A syllogism may be valid even though all of the propositions 
contained in it are false; and a syllogism may contain only true 
propositions yet still be invalid. An example of the former is 
the following argument: 
All United States citizens are citizens of Cuba. 
All citizens of France are citizens of the United States. 
All citizens of France are citizens of Cuba. 
The propositions which constitute this sylloqism are all false; 
yet, it is essential to ~nderstand that the syllogism is neverthe-
less still valid. The conclusion follows necessarily from the two 
premises because of the logical form of the argument, and therefore 
the necessity with which the conclusion follows is a loqical 
necessity. This logical necessity is absent in the following syllo-
gism although its premises and conclusion are true. 
All the inhabitants of the United States live in North America. 
All the inhabitants of Texas live in North America. 
All the inhabitants of Texas are inhabitants of the United 
States. 
Each of the propositions in this syllogism are true, but the syllogi9TI 
is not valid. The conclusion does not follow necessarily from the 
premises although it may at first glance appear to. This syllogism 
11 
does not possess any of the features of valid ~yllogisms; the 
conclusion need not be true if the premises are true, nor would 
the falsity of the conclusion necessitate the falsity of at least 
one of the premises. 
In the case of a syllogism which possesses a valid form and 
which contains true premises the syllogism would then be sound. 
An example of a sound syllogism is, 
All inhabitants of the United States are inhabitants of 
North America. 
All inhabitants of Texas are inhabitants of the United States. 
All inhabitants of Texas are inhabitants of North America. 
The two-fold claim found in each syllogism is fulfilled in this 
syllogism. The propositions which constitute the syllogism are 
true and the syllogism is valid. It is by the fulfillment of this 
two-fold claim that the truth of the conclusion follows necessarily 
from the truth of the premises. The truth of the conclusion 
follows not simply on the basis of the truth of the premises but 
through the valid form of the syllogism. If a syllogism is only 
valid then the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises; 
but if a syllogism is valid and the premises are true, then the 
truth of the conclusion follows necessarily from the truth of the 
premises. The truth of the conclusion is established by the true 
premises though through the validity of the syllogism. 
Although the truth of the conclusion of a sound syllogism 
follows necessarily this does not mean that the conclusion is 
necessarily true. A proposition is necessarily true either if it 
· It 
is analytic or if it refers to a necessary state of fact. The 
differences between these two kinds of necessarily true proposi-
tions will be investigated in Chapter Three. In connection with 
the soundness of a syllogism it is now important to distinguish 
between the truth of a conclusion following necessarily and a 
conclusion which is necessarily true. The truth of the conclusion 
of the sound syllogism presented above follows necessarily but it 
is not a necessary truth. It ·is not analytic nor is it synthetic 
.! priori. lO 
While these remarks concerning sound categorical syllogisms 
may be clear enough, John Stuart Mill has made the accusation 
that the syllogism, even sound syllogisms, can never "prove" the 
truth of the conclusion on the grounds that by its very nature 
it must commit the fallacy of petitio principii. This assertion 
made by Mill and the response made by Alexander Pfander will now 
be presented. 
10rhe distinction between what is necessarily true and a true 
proposition which follows necessarily is not made by Freeman, 
Lo~ic: The Art of Reasoninfi, (New York: David McKay Co. Inc. 
19 7), p. 144~ who claims tat the conclusion of a sound argument 
is necessarily true. 
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CHAPTER II 
.. 
THE POSITIONS OF MILL AND PFANDER 
Mill's Accusation: 
Regarding the nature of the syllogism, John Stuart Mill 
writes the following: 
We have now to inquire .whether the syllogistic pro-
cess, that of reasoning from generals to particulars, 
is or is not a process of inference, a proqress 
from the known to the unknown, a means of coming to a 
knowledge of something we did not know before. 
Logicians have been remarkably unanimous in their 
mode of answering this question. It is universally 
allowed that a syllogism is vicious if there oe any-
_thing more in the conclusion than in the premises. 
But this is, in fact, to say that nothing ever was or 
can be proved by the syllogism which was not known or 
assumed to be known before •.... a syllogism can prove 
no more than is involved in the premises. 11 
It must be granted that in every syllogism considered 
as an argument to prove the conclusion, there is a 
peti ti o pri rici pi i. \~hen we say, 11 A 11 men are morta 1 , 
Socrates is a man, therefore, Socrates is mortal," it is 
unanswerably urged by the adversaries of the syllogistic 
theory, that the propositioij, Socrates is mortal, is pre-
supposed in the more general assumption, All men are 
mortal; that we cannot be assured of the mortality of 
all men, unless we are already certain of the mortality 
of every individual man; that if it be still doubtful 
whether Socrates, or any other individual we choose to 
name, be mortal or not, the same degree of uncertainty 
must hang over the assertion, all men are mortal: that 
John Stuart Mill~ A System of Logic, (Two Volume, London: 
Longmans, Green·, Reader, and Dyer, 1972) Vol. I, p. 209. 
the general principle, instead of being given 
as evidence of the particular case, cannot itself 
be taken for true without exception, until every 
shadow of doubt which could affect any case comprised 
with it, is dispelled by evidence aliunde; and then 
what remains for the syllogism to prove? That in 
short, no reasoning from qenerals to particulars 
can, as such, prove anything: since from a general 
principle we cannot infer any particulars, but those 
which the principle itself assumes as k~~wn. This 
doctrine appears to me irrefragable .... 
These two passages represent the core of Mill's attack 
against the syllogism, and they must therefore be briefly examined 
in order to determine the nature of Mill's claims. This shall be 
done first by looking at Mill's views regarding sylloqistic argu~ 
mentation, and secondly by lookinq at what he means when he says 
that the syllogism commits the petitio principii fallacy. 
Mill's views regardinq syllogistic arqumentation: 
This explanation of Mill's position will begin by pointing 
out that Mill means by the term 11vicious;'in reference to syllogisms 
what was called invalidity in the first chapter of this paper. A 
syllogism which is valid would for Mill not be vicious, whil~ one 
which is invalid would be vicious. Mill claims that an argument is 
vicious whenever there is more in the conclusion than is found or 
assumed in the premises. Another way of stating this would be to 
say that an argument is invalid whenever the conclusion asserts 
more than is found or contained in the premises. What M~ll would 
refer to as a non-vicious argument is one described as valid 1n 
the previous chapter. Mill's explanation of validity and invalidity 
Ibid., p. 210. 
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should not be taken to mean that the conclusion goes quantitative-
ly beyond the premises. It is not as if the conclusion actually 
refers to more particuiar instances than the two premises combined. 
The conclusion of an invalid argument goes beyond the premises in 
the sense that it asserts what cannot be substantiated by the 
premises. The conclusion is not something following from the 
premises but goes beyond them according to what can be inferred 
from them. If the conclusion does not follow necessarily, it must 
therefore assert more than is found in the premises in the sense of 
what can be deduced with necessity. In order to illustrate Mill's 
point, take for example the following invalid argument: 
All dogs are animals. 
All ·tats ate a~imals. 
All cats are dogs. 
This syllogism is invalid; the conclusion does not follow necessay--;. 
ily from the two premises. The conclusion goes beyond what is found 
in the premises, not in the sense that it refers to more cats or to 
more dogs, but in the sense that it claims more than can be deduced 
· from the premises. The middle term in being the predicate of both 
universal affirmative premises does not allow one to conclude that 
the major term is always predicable of the minor term. 
Considering again for the moment the function of the middle 
term in some valid categorical syllogisms, it is by the middle term, 
which appears in both of the premises but not in the conclusion, 
that the major term can be predicated of the minor term. Again, the 
major term is the predicate of the conclusion and the minor term is 
the subject of the conclusion. In one case of a valid cateqorital 
syllogism such as one containing three universal affirmative 
propositions in the first figure, it is because what is referred 
to by the major term is always predicable of what is referred to 
by the middle term, and what is referred to by the middle term is 
always predicable of what is referred to by the minor term that it 
necessarily follows that what is referred to by the major term 
must always be predicable of what is referred to by the minor term. 
The middle term functions to, so to speak, 11 bring together 11 the 
referents of the major and minor terms. 13 ·A syllogism of this 
form is for example one previously mentioned. 
All United States citizens are citizens of Cuba. 
All French citizens are citizens of the United States. 
All French citizens are citizens -of Cuba. 
This syllogism is not sound but it is valid, and the conclusion 
does not assert more than is found in the premises, that is, it 
does not go beyond in its cl aim what can be deduced ·w; th necessity 
from the conclusion. 
From this explanation of the nature of validity, Mill asserts 
that the conclusion of any valid syllogism, even syllogisms which 
are sound, cannot assert anything new. If the conclusion represents 
new knowledge, then it must qo beyond the premises, but if the 
conclusion goes beyond the premises, then the syllogism cannot be 
The predication is of what is referred to by the concepts of 
the proposition, for it is foolish to say that in the proposition, 
11Leaves are green, 11 that green is a property of the concept, 
11 leave. 11 
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valid. The syllogism cannot at the same time assert somethinq 
new and also follow necessarily from the two premises. This is 
one assertion of Mill which will later have to be critically 
examined. The second assertion closely related to this one is 
Mill's claim that the syllogism by its very nature commits the 
fallacy of petitio principii. 
The validity of the syllogism & the petitio principii fallacy: 
It is in establishing the soundness of the syllogism that 
Mill claims the petitio principii fallacy is unavoidably 
committed. It is not merely because of the fact that in a valid 
syllogism the conclusion is contained in the premises -- since 
it cannot claim more than can be deduced from the premises if 
it is to be valid -- that Mill claims a petitio principii fallacy 
is present. The validity of -the argument is presupposed in the 
following way. Since the conclusion of a valid argument is 
contained in the premises, the truth of the conclusion must be 
known if the truth of the premises is known. The truth of the 
conclusion is needed to establish the truth of the premises since 
the conclusion is contained in the premises, otherwise the syllo-
gism would be invalid. Unless the truth of the conclusion is es-
tablished, the truth of the premises remains uncertain . It is in need-
ing to know the truth of the conclusion that the petitio principii 
fallacy occurs, for the truth _of the conclusion is used in order 
to establish the truth of the premises which are supposea to 
establish the truth of the conclusion. Instead of true premises 
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proving the truth of the conclusion, one must know the truth of 
the conclusion in order to establish the truth of the premises. 
This preceding fact is a consequence of the validity of the 
syllogism itself. 
Mill.'s accusations against the syllogism can be briefly 
summarized in the following manner. Since the conclusion of a . 
valid syllogism cannot go beyond the premises, it must in that 
sense be contained in them. Yet, if it is contained in them, the 
conclusion cannot assert anything new. The conclusion cannot 
assert anything new not only because of the validity of the syllo-
gism, but also because the truth of the conclusion must be known 
if the truth of the premises is to be known. This follows from 
the fact that the conclusion is contained in the premises, and it 
therefore amounts to the fallacy of petitio principii. The syllo-
gism can never prove the truth of the conclusion for it cannot 
arrive at anything new if the syllogism is to be valid and the 
truth of the premises known. 
It is important to understand that even thouqh Mill claims 
that by the validity of the argument the truth of the conclusion 
must be known in order to establish the truth of the premises, 
once their truth is established, the argument is nevertheless 
still sound. The syllogism is sound but the conclusion was not 
proven. The truth of the conclusion was not proven since its 
truth was needed to establish the truth of the premises. 
Before Mill's assertions and accusations are critically 
analyzed, Alexander Pfander's remarks on this problem will be 
presented. 
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Pfander's views on the syllogism: 
Although Alexander Pfander in his ·Loqik never explicitly 
mentions Mill nor specifically the petitio principii fallacy, he 
certainly has Mill in mind when he writes the following: 
Some objections which hqve been ratsed against 
the traditional view of the syllogism address 
themselves against the first figure and specifically 
against the fact that in the major premise the 
general judgement is taken as a universal. The uni-
versal judgement it is said already includes the 
conclusion and presupposes its truth if itself is to 
be true. It is said that in the conclusion no new 
judgement is gained but ~nly an unfoldinq of the 
major premise is given. 1 
Pfander continues by saying that the objection is correct. This 
objection which Pfander describes above is precisely the objection 
which Mill raised. Although Pfander thinks this .objection is 
correct, he does not claim that it is applicable to all syllogisms. 
In some cases the premises may actually prove the truth of the 
conclusion, while in other cases they may not. Pfander never 
mentions the petitio principii fallacy and instead asserts that in 
some syl~ogisms there is no proof since the conclusion of the 
syllogism is presupposed by or included in the universal major 
premise. Thus he distingu ·ishe$ ti.etween what he calls a relation-
ship of truth and a relationship of proof. This distinction is 
partially explained in the following passage: 
4 
·rn that the argument draws out one judgement from 
one or more other judgements, i~ posits at the same 
time the truth of the deduced judgement, the 
A. Pfander, Logik, (Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1963), 
p. 316 (translated by the author of this thesis). 
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conclusion, as following necessarily from the 
truth of the premises. It makes the claim not 
only that the premises are true and i t itself is 
valid, but also that the truth of the conclusion 
is given necessarily with the tr~th of the pre-
mises. It presupposes then that between the 
premises and the conclusion in fact consists a 
definite relation of truth. The relation of truth 
which each argument presupposes is however not 
necessarily a relation of proof, that is, the 
premises, with whose truth is necessarily given 
the truth of the conclusion, need not necessarily 
prove the conclusion. A relationship of proof 
consists namely between the premi~es and the con-
clusion only then when not only with the truth of 
the premises is given necessarily the truth of the 
conclusion, but also when the truth of the premises 
in no way already presupposes the conclusion. 15 
It is clear from this passage that Pfander does not go as far as 
Mill for Mill claimed that no syllogism can be a proof. The reason , 
which Pfander gives in support of the claim that in some cases the 
conclusion of an argument, as a particular judgement, is included 
in the premise which is a universal judgement.16 ·However, this 
need not be true in every case. Pfander asserts that the conclu-
ti on of an argument can actually be pr.oven for in some cases 
neither premise may presuppose the conclusion. The question whether 
or not the syllogism is a proof depends on what kind of judgements 
are found as premises in the syllogism. Pfander distinguishes be-
tween one kind of universal judgement called a proving deductive 
judgement of kind and another kind of universal judgement called a 
collective ind~ctive universal judq~ment. The universal .judgement 
itself does not by its form indicate which kind of universal 
Ibid., p. 248 (Translated by the author of this thesis). 
16--
Ibid., p. 248. 
judgement it is.17 When the premises are collective inductive 
universal judgements then it is only a summary of all particular 
judgements which already assert of each particular what the 
universal judgement asserts. 18 In such a case, the particular 
judgements are presupposed by the universal judgement and the 
latter depends on the former for its own truth. The questio~ 
whether one has an inductive universal judgement or a provinq 
deductive judgement of kind depends on the relationship between 
the predicate and the subject of the proposition. If the object 
referred to by the predicate concept is predicate of the subject 
because of the nature of the object referred to by the subject 
concept then one has a judgement which is not the mere summary of 
all particular judgements, and it will not therefore presuppose 
the particular judgements for . its own truth. 19 In the case where 
the object referred to by the subject is not the reason for the 
predication of the predicate then one has a collective inductive 
universal judgement which can never prove the truth of any parti-
cular judgement for it presupposes the truth of each particular 
judgement for its own truth. 20 
Pfander's explanation of what occurs when the major premise 
of a syllogism is a collective inductive universal judgement 
Ibid., 
,a--
p. 329. 
fbi d. , p. 320. 
19--
Ibid., 
20-- p. 229-230. 
ibid., pp. 329, 331. 
22 
corresponds exactly to what Mill asserts. Pfander disagrees 
with Mill since Pfander claims that not all syllogisms need 
contain propositions which cannot prove the truth of the 
conclusion. The question whether Mill or Pfander is correct, 
and the question whether or not Pfander's defense of the 
syllogism is entirely accurate will now be considered. 
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CHAPTER I I I
THE NATURE OF PROOFS AND THE CATEGORICAL SY LOGISM 
The critical evaluation and examination of Mill's and 
Pfander1 s position on the syllogism will beqin first with an investi-
gation into the issue itself. A disagreement or aqreement with what 
they assert is significant only on the basis of a present investiga-
tion into the issues which they dealt with, and on the basis of the 
results and discoveries such an investigation will yield. This 
third chapter will be devoted to such an investiqation, while the 
fourth chapter will take the results obtained and compare them to 
Mill 1 s and Pfander's positions. 
The general question with which this third ch?pter will be 
concerned is whether or not it is true that all sound syllogisms 
are proofs. In a sound sylloqism, is the truth of the conclusion 
always proven by the truth of the premises? In fact, what does it 
even mean to say that the truth of the conclusion is 11proven11? 
Mill of course asserts that no syllogism, not even a sound syllogism, 
can ever prove the truth of the conclusion. Pfander, however, claims 
that only in some instances is it true to say that the, conclusion 
was not proven, while in other cases the truth of the conclusion is 
proven by the truth of the premises. 
The first section of this chapter will consist of an investi-
gation into the principal reason why in some cases the truth of tha 
conclusion is proven while in other cases it is not. Although 
this analysis will proceed in a direction similar to Pfander1 s 
this i nves ti qati on wi 11 attempt to go beyond Pfander I s exp l ana-
ti on and will try to arrive at an accurate analysis of the 
problem of the probative force of the syllogism. In this 
connection the question will be raised and discussed in a second 
section whether or not the failure of the syllogism to, in some 
cases, prove the conclusion is the result of its committing the 
fallacy .of petitio principii. A third section of this chapter 
will then attempt to show how in at least one instance a sound 
syllogism actually proves the truth of the conclusion. 
The absence of probative force in some sound syllogisms: 
If a syllogism is to prove the truth of the conclusion, 
then the syllogism must of course be sound. The syllogism must 
possess a logical form which is valid and each premise must be 
true. Yet, can it be said that when a syllogism is sound that 
the truth of the conclusion is proved by the truth of the pre-
mises? It is of course understandable why someone might 
immediately reply in the affirmative; for the truth of the con-
clusion certainly follows from the truth of the premises through 
the validity of the argument. The truth of the conclusion cer-
tainly follows but was the truth of the conclusion actually 
proven? Did the premises have probative force? In order to 
reveal why the soundness of the syllogism is only a necessary 
but not a sufficient condition for the truth of the conclusion 
to be proven, one must examine a specific kind of relation which 
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may exist between the premises and- the conclusion of a syllogism. 
Some of the relations existing between the premises and 
the conclusion of a valid syllogism have previously been men-
tioned. For example, in a valid syllogism if the premises are 
true then the conclusion must also be true; or in a valid syllo-
gism, if the conclusion is false, one of the premises must also 
be false. Even the validity of a syllogism itself points to a 
relation between the premises and the conclusion. These relations 
are grounded in the logical structure of the syllogism and for 
this reason can quite simply be called logical relations. However, 
these relations can also be called formal relations since they 
are independent of the material content of the propositions which 
constitute the syllogism. The material content of the premises 
is irrelevant to the question of the validity of the syllogism. 
This was pointed out before in Chapter One. 
However, the relation which is crucial to the question of 
· the probative force of the premises in a · sound syllogism is a 
material relation dealing with the material content of the pro-
positions which comprise the argument. If a specific kind of 
material relation exists between the premises and the conclusion 
of a\ sound argument, then the premises cannot prove the truth of 
the conclusion if they are themselves to be true. In order to 
show exactly what this relation is, first an important distinc-
tion must be made between two essentially different types of 
propositions based precisely upon their material content. 
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The difference between continqent and essentially necessary 
propositions: continqent propositions: 
The word 11contingent 11 may apply either to the existence of a 
thing or to the essence of a thing. In the propositions, 11Mr. 
Smith is wearing a blue shirt," the affirmed state of fact is con-
tingent since Mr. Smith need not wear a blue shirt; it is not 
necessary that he wear a shirt of some particular color. He 
might very well wear a shirt of a different color instead of blue 
or even no shirt at all. The proposition is contingent since the 
state of fact it affirms need not be and could not be otherwise. 
Of course Mr. Smith's existence is also contingent; he does not 
necessarily exist. What is of interest and importance for the 
problem under consideration is not contingency as applied to the 
existence of ,a thing, but contingency when it refers to the essence 
of a thing. The state of fact affirmed in the proposition pre- . 
sented above is contingent since it does not belonq necessarily to 
the essence of Mr. Smith that he wear a blue shirt. It does not 
belong necessarily to the essence of Mr. Smith that he wear a shirt 
of some particular color and therefore the state of fact that he is 
wearing a blue shirt is contingent. It need not be and could 
be otherwise. 
Since the state of fact is contingent, the proposition which 
·affirms this state of fact can also be called contingent, and if 
the proposition is true, its truth can be called a contingent 
truth. If it is said that in a proposition the predicate need 
not belong to the subject, properly speaking what is meant is 
't./ 
that what is referred to by the predicate concept of the proposi-
tion does not belong necessarily to that which is referred to by 
the subject concept. The referent of the subject concept could 
lack the predicate and have a different predicate instead. 
The nature of contingent states of fact will perhaps become 
more apparent if one contemplates the nature of the states of fact 
affirmed in each of the followinq two propositions: 
l) Some chairs are made of wood. 
2) All the women in the audience are unmarried. 
The state of fact affirmed in each proposition is contingent. A 
chair, to be a chair, need not be made of wood and it is possible 
that it be made from some other material like for example plastic 
or some kind of metal. Likewise, the women in the audience need 
not be unmarried; some or even all of them could have been married. 
These states of fact are contingent since one element of the state 
of fact (what is referred to by the predicate) does not belong 
necessarily to the essence of the other element (what is referred · 
to by the subject). In this way, one could say that the predicate 
does not belong to the subject necessarily and that therefore the 
proposition is contingent. If the proposition is true, its truth 
is only contingent. 
Essen ti ally necessary propos i ti ans : 
When a proposition is necessary, its necessity may consist 
in a specific kind of logical relation between the subject concept 
and the predicate concept, or its necessity may consist in the 
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fact that what is referred to by the predicate concept belongs 
necessarily to the essence of what is referred to by the subject 
concept. In the former case the predicate concept affirms either · 
partially or completely what is already affirmed by the subject 
concept. It is partial for example in the proposition "All 
beachelors are unmarried," since being unmarried makes up only 
part of the concept bachelor; bachelors are also male. In the 
proposition, ''All computers are computers" the predicate merely 
repeats completely what is found in the subject. The predicate 
affirms exactly what the subject affirms. These propositions, 
which can be called analytic since the predicate does not affirm 
something different from the subject, must necessarily be true 
due to this relation between the subject concept and the predicate 
concept.21 
However, in the case of propositions which are essentially 
necessary, the predicate refers to something different than what 
is referred to by the subject -- for whi ch reason these proposi-
tions can be called synthetic as opposed to analytic -- and 
therefore their necessity lies not in any logical relation between 
the subject concept and the predicate concept, but in the fact 
that what is referred to by the predicate concept belongs necessar~ 
ily to the essence of what is referred to by the subject concept. 
The predicate belonqs necessarily to the subject even though the 
The term analytic is here used in the sense in which it 
applies to identity statements and to cases in which the predi-
cate is part of ·what is included in the subject concept. 
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predicate is different from the subject. The proposition is 
necessary because the state of fact it asserts is necessary. 
What is referred to by the subject provides a reason for the 
predication of what is referred to by the predicate. Further, 
the predicate belongs to the subject necessarily. One element 
of the state of fact (what is referred to by the predicate) belongs 
to the essence of the other element (what is referred to by the 
subject) necessarily. This necessity can therefore be called an 
essential necessity, which differs from analytic necessity and from 
contingent states of fact and propositions.22 This difference will 
become clearer if one compares the contingent propositions examined 
above with the following two essentially necessary propositions. 
1) A square necessarily has diagonals equal in length. 
2) Color must necessarily be extended in at least two 
dimensions. 
The states of fact asserted by each proposition are essentially 
necessary. It belongs necessarily to the essence of a square that it 
have diagonals equal in length, just as it belongs necessarily to the 
essence of color that it be extended in two dimensions. Each of the 
asserted states of fact cannot be otherwise; it is impossible that 
the state of fact be different. In this way one can say that the 
proposition is essentially necessary since the state of fact is 
It should perhaps be also pointed out that all analytic pro-
positions presuppose propositions which are essentially necessary. 
They presuppose certain truths on the general nature of being, like 
for example, the law of identity, and the law of non-contradiction. 
They also presuppose certain truths regarding the nature of truth, 
necessity, concepts, propositions, etc. 
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essentially necessary; or simply that the predicate belongs 
necessarily to the subject . 23 
The difference in the truth of contingent and necessary 
propositions: particular instances and propositions: 
The difference between contingent and essentially necessary 
propositions points to a difference in the conditions under which 
each of them can be true. Of course each of them is true only if 
and whenever what the proposition affirms corresponds to rea 1 i ty. • 
However, what each proposition corresponds to will of course be 
different, and the conditions which must be fulfilled order for 
contingent propositions to be true are not the same conditions 
which must be fulfilled in order for essentially necessary proposi-
tions to be true. These differences must be explained in detail 
for it is with .these differences that the probative force of the 
premises in the sylloqism depend. 
In speaking of conditions for the truth of propositions, more 
specifically what is meant here in this context is the dependency 
which each proposition has upon particular existing instances of 
what is affirmed by the proposition. There are at least three 
different relations of dependency which the truth of a proposition 
Because conti~gency may refer either to a thing's exi stence 
or to its essence, a proposition may refer to an object which has 
a contingent existence yet which has certain necessary features in 
its essence. This color brown need not exist but certainly the 
fact that it is here and now necessarily extended means that the 
state of fact grounded in this brown is a necessary state of fact . 
The term "essentially necessary" proposition will be used to refer 
only to propositions affirming a necessary state of fact which has 
no contingency either in existence or essence. 
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may in principle have on particular instances or examples. How-
ever, before these three possible relations are examined, the 
following difference between contingent and necessary propositions 
should be stressed for it will be crucial in deciding which of the 
three relatons apply to contingent propositions and which of them 
apply to essentially necessary propositions. 
It was mentioned before that in speaking of a contingent 
proposition, what was meant strictly speaking is that the state of 
fact which the proposition affirms is continqent. The state of fact 
is contingent because one element of the state of fact does not be-
long to the other element necessarily. The proposition which asserts 
a contingent state of fact is also contingent. The question, how-
ever, is in what sense one can speak of the truth of a contingent 
proposition as also being contingent. A true contingent proposition 
i~ certairily continqent. The state of fact could change. Thus, in 
the examples of contingent propositions quoted above, it is possible 
that there be no chairs made of wood; or some of the women in the 
audience may become married or married women may enter the audience. 
Therefore, the .state of fact that some chairs are made of wood is 
contingent and the proposition which affirms this state of fact can 
for this reason be called contingently true. But does the proposi-
tion which is contingently true become false if the contingent 
state of fact which it affirms changes? To be sure, the proposition 
need not ever have been true, for the state of fact need never have 
obtained. But can a contingent proposition once it is true ever 
become false? It would seem that it cannot for the following 
reason. 
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Suppose someone asserts that some of the chairs in the room 
in which he is standing are made of wood; and suppose that he is 
correct. Suppose further that after he has made the true asser-
tion all of the wooden chairs in the room are removed. If the 
same person were to now assert that some of the chairs in the room 
in which he is standing are made of wood, then what he asserted 
would of course be false; for it is now the case that no chair in 
the room is made of wood. But is the proposition which he first 
asserted the same proposition he asserted later? Not if there was 
the element of time included in each of the two assertions. Given 
this element of time one-proposition can only be true or false, 
and, once it is either, its truth or falsity cannot change. With-
out this element of time the same proposition would be true and 
false; for one could not claim that it is at one time true and at 
another time false. Since a proposition cannot be both true and 
false, it would seem that the truth of a contingent propositio,:i 
must be described in the following way. 
Although one may speak of a contingent state of fact as 
changing, one cannot say that the truth of a contingent proposition 
can change. A contingent proposition cannot at one time be true 
and at another time be false. On~e it is true then it remains 
forever true, even though a different state of fact may at a later 
time obtain. The contingently true proposition is still not 
necessarily true for the state of fact to which it corresponds is 
still contingent. The contingent proposition need never have been 
true because the state of fact need never have been. 
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The situation is quite different in the case of an essentially 
necessary proposition. The state of fact with which the proposition 
corresponds cannot change, and therefore there is no question that 
an essentially necessary proposition is forever true. It is always 
true because of the essential necessity of the state of fact.24 • 
This difference between contingent and essentially necessary 
propositions should be kept in mind during the proceeding discussion 
of the relation between the truth of propositions and the existence 
of particular instances of what it affirms. 
The first relation of dependency; the actual existence 
of particular instances: 
Some propositions not only assert that the predicate belongs 
to the subject but also imply that instances of the subject actually 
exist. The proposition, "Men are wearing blue shirts," implies that 
men actually exist. The same is true of other propositions looked 
at previously. The proposition, "Some chairs are made of wood," 
implies that chairs actually exist; and the proposition, "All the 
women in the audience are unmarried" implies that there are actually 
women in the audience. Certainly any proposition which implies that 
particular instances actually exist cannot be true unless there are 
actually existing instances. 25 This first relation of dependency is 
The meaning of essential necessity should not be confused with 
the fact that a proposition which corresponds with reality must be 
true, and the fact that it must then be true since a proposition 
cannot be true and false. 
25The question whether or not the non-existence of particular 
instances entails the falsity of a proposition which implies that 
particular instances exist is a question very difficult to fully 
answer, and will not be investigated. 
is sufficiently explained by sayinq that if a proposition implies 
that particular instances of what it asserts do in fact exist, 
then the proposition cannot be true unless there are existing 
instances. 
The ~resence of conformity between the Proposition and 
particular instances: 
Another way the truth of a proposition depends upon particular 
instances is that unless each particular instance conforms to the 
way the proposition asserts they will be -- if they exist -- the 
proposition cannot be true. In the proposition, "Men are wearinq 
blue shirts," unless each man is wearing a blue shirt the proposi-
tion is not true. This relation of dependency is quite distinct 
from the first relation. This second relation of dependency exists 
regardless of whether or not a proposition implies that particular 
instances exist. Thus, in the proposition, "Moral values can only 
be embodied in persons, 11 althouqh the proposition does not imply 
that there are any existing persons possessinq a moral value, it is 
still quite true to say each being which possesses a moral value 
must be a person, otherwise the proposition is false. But the 
proposition is not false if no persons bearing moral values exist. 
This second relation of dependency can therefore be framed 
in the form of a conditional proposition by saying that all parti-
cular instances must be in conformity with the proposition, if 
they exist. It is clear that this second relation is different 
from the first relation introduced above. The first relation 
referred to the fact that a proposition which implies the existence 
of particular instances can only be true if particular instances 
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actually exist, but the fact that they exist does not mean they 
are true. The particulars must also conform to the way the 
prpposition asserts they will be, and this second relation applies 
whether or not the proposition also implies that particular 
instances exist. 
This is further shown in the fact that one can take out from 
a proposition its implication of the existence of particulars, yet~ 
this second relation of dependency nevertheless still remains. 
For example, one o·f the propositions quoted above can be reformula-
ted into the conditional,"If men exist, men are wearing blue shirts," 
which allows one to prescind from the question of whether or not 
men actually exist. Nevertheless, the conformity of the proposi-
tion with particular instances, should they exist, is still a 
necessary requirement for the truth of the proposition. Therefore, 
any particular instance, whether possible or real, must conform to 
the proposition if the proposition is to be true. If there are 
particular instances, unless they conform to what is asserted by 
the proposition, the proposition cannot be true. 
Some prohositions are true because of the way particulars are, 
while ot er propositions are not: 
The third relation of dependency a proposition may have on 
particular instances is much more difficult to comprehend for it 
can easily be confused with either of the fi-r,st two relations 
already mentioned.· In order to avoid as much. confusion as possible, 
it should be immediately pointed out that this third relation of 
dependency is characteristic only and always of continqent 
propositions and is never present in essentially necessary 
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propositions. Thi_s third relation of dependency can be described 
in the following way. A proposition is dependent on particular 
instances when the proposition is true because the particular 
instances exist in the manner claimed by the proposition. One 
can explain and demonstrate this according to the following 
procedure. Since this third relation of dependency is always 
found in contingent propositions and never in propositions which-
are essentially necessary, by comparing these two kinds of pro-
positions this third relation should become apparent. These two 
kinds of propo~itions will be compared in a specific way. An 
example of each of these two kinds of propositions will be put in 
a form such that each of them has the same relation of dependency 
on particulars which the other has except for this third relation. 
In this way, the third relation of dependency will be clearly 
manifested. 
In the proposition, "Men are wearing blue shirts, if men 
exist," the implication of existence has been taken out of the 
proposition. Therefore, the first possible relation of dependency 
the truth of a proposition can have on particular existing _· - · 
instances is not present, although the second relation of de-
pendency still remains. In the proposition, "Moral values can 
only be embodied in persons, 11 there is no implication that actual 
instances exist although the second relation of depend.ency is 
still present. The two propositions are alike in that the first 
relation of dependency is absent in each, while the second rela-
tion of dependency is present in each. Yet, the contingent 
proposition is nevertheless dependent on particulars in a way the 
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essentially necessary proposition is not. It is possible to 
say of the necessary proposition that it is true regardless of 
whether or not any particular instances exist. It is true 
even if no particular instance ever existed or will ever exist . 
There is a freedom from particular instances which is not pre-
sent in the case of the contingent proposition. The contingent 
proposition quoted above does not imply that any particular 
instances actually exist, yet, one cannot say of the contingent 
proposition that it is true even if no particular instances . 
exist, have existed, or will ever exist. Unlike the essentially 
necessary proposition the particular instances are needed (even 
if they are not implied) to establish the truth of the proposi-
tion; and the proposition is true because the particular in-
stances are the way the proposition asserts them to be. The 
opposite is the case with essentially necessary propositions. 
The particular instances are they way they are because of the 
truth of the essentially necessary proposition. 
The presence or absence of this third relation of depend-
ency on particular instances goes back to the fundamental 
difference between contingent and essentially necessary proposi-
tions or states of fact. In a contingent proposition, since 
the predicate need not belong to the subject, the proposition 
is true not only unless but because the particulars are the way 
the proposition asserts them to be. In an essentially 
necessary proposition, since the predicate belongs necessarily 
to the essence of the subject any particular instance possessing 
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the essence talked about in the proposition must also possess 
the predicate. This means that the proposition can be true 
even if no particular instances exist, and if they exist they 
must possess the predicate since the proposition is necessari-
ly true. The nature of this third relation of dependency will 
become even clearer when one examines the following question. 
It is the questio~ regarding whether or not all contingent 
propositions imply the existence of particular instances, and 
if this is ever so with essentially necessary propositions. 
This question will now be answered in the context of the more 
general question concerning the presence or absence of either 
of these three relations of dependency on particular instances 
with respect to contingent and essentially necessary propositions. 
The deeendency on particular instances; contingent and 
essentially necessary propositions: 
A contingent proposition may but need not imply that 
particular instances actually exist. The contingent proposi-
tion, 11Men are wearing blue shirts" certainly does, but the 
proposition framed in the form of a hypothetical does not. The 
proposition, "Men are wearing blue shirts, if men exist,•• is 
still contingent although the implication of existence has been 
taken away. Of course, the latter proposition is a hypotheti-
cal and not a categorical proposition, yet, it is nevertheless 
still contingent. One can conclude that all categorical 
propositions which are contin gent imply the existence of 
particular instances. 
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Essentially necessary propositions never imply the 
existence of particular instances. The predication is always 
of what belongs to the subject and therefore the existence of 
the subject is . not implied.2 6 
It may be ambiguous whether or not a proposition implies 
that particular instances actually exist. For example, in the 
proposition, ''All colors are necessarily extended in two dimen-
sions," it is unclear whether or not the proposition is referring 
to the fact that all existing colors are extended, or to the fact 
that a color must be extended in two dimensions in order to 
exist. In the former case, since there is an implication of 
_ existence, particular instances must exist otherwise the proposi-
tion cannot be true. In the latter case, since there is no im-
plication of ~xistence, no particulars need exist in order for 
the proposition to be true. 
Regarding the second relation of dependency, the truth of 
a proposition can have on particular instances, all propositions 
have such a dependency. The proposition, whether it be contin-
gent or necessary, can only be true if the particular instances 
conform to what is asserted by the proposition . . One could say 
that the proposition could not be true if there were counter-
examples~ In the case of essentially necessary propositions, 
the particular instances must conform because of the necessary 
26The exception to this would be the proposition which 
asserted that existence belonged necessarily to the essence of 
a being. 
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truth of the proposition, while in the case of contingent pro-
positions, there is no necessity that the particular instances 
conform to what the proposition asserts. This means that the 
possibility of counter-examples is ruled out in the case of 
essentially necessary propositions. A counter-example is im-
possible. This latter difference points to the third relation 
of dependency which i~ always present in contingent propositions 
but never present in essentially necessary propositions. Still, 
the second relation of dependency is present in both, for if 
particular in~tances exist, then they must conform with the 
proposition, otherwise the proposition is false. 
Continqent categorical propositions and essentially 
necessary propos1t1ons: 
Since the general concern of this paper is with categori-
cal syllogisms and therefore categorical propositions, a few 
remarks should now be made regarding the three relations of 
dependency as they apply to categorical propositions both con-
tingent and necessary. 
A contingent categorical proposition possesses all three of 
the relations of dependency which the truth of a proposition may 
have on particular instances. In order for the proposition to 
be true, particular instances must exist, they must conform to 
what the proposition asserts, and it is because of the way the 
particular instances are that the proposition is true. Thus, in 
the contingent categorical proposition, ''All women have brown 
hair," its truth depends first on there existing women, secondly 
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in that unless they have brown hatr, the proposition cannot be 
true, and thirdly if the proposition is true, it is true be-
cause the particular instances conform to what is asserted by 
the proposition. 
An essentially necessary categorical proposition does not 
possess the first or the third relation of dependency on parti-
cular instances. It does possess the second, fqr if particular 
instances do exist then they must correspond to what the proposi-
tion asserts. In the essentially necessary contingent proposi-
tion, 11The square necessarily has diagonals equal in length," 
there need not be existing instances of squares in order for the 
proposition to be true. The proposition is true even if no parti-
cular instances exist. This means there is no implication that 
particular instances exist, nor is the proposition true because 
the particular instances are the way the proposition asserts them 
to be. However, one can still say that if particular instances do 
exist then they must conform to what is asserted by the proposi-
tion, although their lack of conformity is impossible because of 
the essential necessity of the proposition. 
The question which must now be discussed is what signifi-
cance these results have with respect to the investigation into 
the difference between sound syllogisms and proofs. 
Sound cateqorical sylloqisms and continoent categorical 
propositions: 
When premises of a categorical syllogism, even a sound 
categorical syllogism, are contingent propositions then the 
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truth of the conclusion cannot be proven by them. Contingently 
true propositions cannot prove the truth of the conclusion, even 
if the syllogism is valid. The fact that they are contingent 
means they have no probative force. The contingency of the 
premises precludes the possibility that by their truth and the 
validity of the argument, the truth of the conclusion can be 
proven.27 The reason for this can be explained in the following 
way using the information which has been presented up to this 
point; 
If the premises of a categorical syllogism are contingent, 
their truth depends on the existence of particulars in the three 
ways which were explained above. What is presently of signifi-
cance is the third relation described. It was that contingent 
propositions are true because the particulars are the way the 
proposition asserts them to be. In other words, since the 
predicate does not belong necessarily to the essence of the 
subject, the proposition is true because each instance of the 
subject happens to have what is referred to by the predicate. 
The particular instances need not have the predicate since the 
proposition is only contingent. In this sense it is the fact 
that they have the predicate which is the reason for the truth 
of the proposition. It is therefore quite appropriate to say 
that a particular instance of the subject happens to have the 
predicate, since the predicate need not belong to the subject. 
See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Book I, Chapter 
Chapter 6, 75a, 18-22. 
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Therefore the particular instance having the predicate is prior 
to the truth of the proposition and is somethinq upon which the 
truth of the proposition depends and follows from. 
In the case of a cateqorical syllogism containing premises 
which are contingent like for example, . 
. All the people in the room are married . 
. All the university faculty are in the lroom. 
All the university faculty are Married. 
each of the premises are contingent, which means they are true 
because each particular instance happens to have what the predi-
cate affirms. It is possible that some people in the room be 
unmarried, and not all of the university faculty need be in the 
room. Each premise would be true if each person in the room is 
married and-i-f the entire university faculty are in the room. 
The first important point which must be recoqnized is that the 
particular instances upon which the truth of each premise depends 
are at least some of the particular instances referred to by the 
conclusion. This of course presupposes that the ar~ument is valid. 
This presupposition of the validity only guarantees that the parti-
cular instances referred to by the conclusion .are the same parti-
cular instances referred to by the premises. The presupposition 
of validity can be further explained the followinq way. 
The particular instances referred to by the conclusion are 
at least some of the particular instances upon which the truth of 
the major premise depends, given the truth of the minor pre-
mise. In other words, if all the university faculty are in the 
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room, then each of them must be married, otherwise the major 
premise cannot be true. 
In a similar way, the truth of the minor premise depends 
upon the particular instances referred to by the conclusion 
provided that the major premise is true. If all the people in 
the room are married, each faculty member must be married, 
otherwise the minor premise cannot be true. 
The particular instances upon which the truth of each 
premise depends are at least some of the particular instances 
referred to by the conclusion, and in this way the truth of 
each premise presupposes the truth of the conclusion. Because 
at least some of the particular instances are the same, any 
uncertainty regarding the truth of the conclusion extends to the 
premises. The premises cannot very well prove the truth of the 
conclusion if they presuppose the truth of the conclusion for 
their own truth. Without the truth of the conclusion they 
themselves cannot be true since they have .. at least some particu-
lar instances in corrmon. 
It represents no objection to these findings to claim that 
one premise, whether it be the -major or the minor, presupposes 
the truth of the conclusion only if the other premise is true. 
The truth of the other premise serves only to guarantee that the 
particular instances which the truth of the premise would follow 
from are at least some of the particular instances referred to by 
the conclusion. The presupposition is still one dealing with the 
material content of the premises even though the validity of the 
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syllogism may be presupposed. Each premise presupposes the 
truth of the conclusion not simply because the argument is 
valid. They each presuppose the truth of the conclusion because, 
in being contingent propositions, their truth depends on the 
fact that ea~h particular instance of the subject happens to 
have the predicate. That each particular instance has the pre-
dicate is in some sense prior to the truth of the proposition. 
Therefore, if at least some of the particular instances upon which 
the truth of a proposition depends are also referred to by another 
proposition, the first proposition cannot prove the truth of the 
second proposition, since the truth of the second proposition is 
presupposed for the truth of the first proposition. This can be 
illustrated in a less complex way than the argument.form of a 
categorical syllogism. 
From the proposition, "All chairs are brown,11 one can argue 
that, "Some chairs are brown.11 This immediate argument form is 
certainly valid. However, since the premise of the argument is 
only contingent, its truth follows from each particular instance 
(each chair) having the predicate {brown). The conclusion of the 
argument refers to at least some of the . instances which the truth 
of the premise depends upon, and therefore the truth of the con-
clusion is presupposed by the truth of the premise. Since the 
truth of .the proposition, "All chairs are brown, 11 depends upon 
each particular instance of a chair in fact being brown, the truth 
of the proposition presupposes already that some of the particular 
instances of chairs are brown. 
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This third relation of dependency which results from the 
fact that the proposition is contingent is present even in more 
complex argument forms such as the categorical syllogism. The 
truth of the conclusion is presupposed by each premise, if the 
premises are contingent, for the particular instances referred 
to by the conclusion are at least some of the particular instances 
referred to by the premises and which the truth of the premises 
would depend upon. The true premises cannot prove the truth of 
the conclusion, for the truth of the conclusion is presupposed 
by the truth of the premises since they refer to some of the same 
particular instances on which their truth depends. 
Although these remarks may become clearer by showing how 
this third relation of dependency on particular instances is 
absent in necessary propositions, and how a categorical syllo-
gism containing premises which are essentially necessary can 
actually prove the truth of the conclusion, one must first 
examine whether or not the relation of dependency which the pre-
mises have on the conclusion amounts to the fallacy of petitio 
principii. 
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The Fallacy of Petitio Principii: 
Fallacies are errors ~r mistak!s in reasoning, and they 
have generally been classified under the headings, "formal" and 
11informal 11 • A few remarks must therefore be made regarding the 
meaning of these two terms. 
Formal and informal fallacies: 
Formal fallacies are errors in reasoning that affect the 
formal relation of validity between the premises and the conclu-
sion. With respect to the syllogism, an example of a formal 
fallacy is that of "negative premises." This mistake refers to 
the fact that any categorical syllogism with two premises that are 
each negative must be invalid and cannot be valid. The premises 
and also the conclusion may by chance be true, but the argument 
is necessarily invalid. 
Informal fallacies, however, do not affect the formal rela-
tion of validity, but instead affect the truth of the premises of 
the argument. An argument can be formally valid yet commit an 
informal fallacy. The consideration of the two examples may 
illustrate this point. 
In the informal fallacy of ad verecundium (appeal to 
authority) or the informal fallacy of ad populum (appeal to the 
majority), an error occurs because of the falsity of one of the 
premises in the argument. For example, an argument may have as a 
conclusion, "Murder is morally wrong," and a premise, "Most people 
think murder is mora•lly wrong." The missing premise of this 
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enthymeme28 which would make it valid is the premise, "What 
most people think is true is true." However, this latter 
premise is false and can, by its material content, be classified 
as the fallacy which occurs when the truth of a proposition is 
said to follow from the fact that a majority of people think it 
is true; or simply the fallacy of appeal to the majority. 
The same is true of the fallacy of ad verecundium. In this 
case, the false premise would assert that a person who was an 
authority in one particular field was also an authority in 
another unrelated field. 
The numerous informal fallacies are classified according 
to the material content of the proposition which is used as a 
premise to establish the validity of the arqument. 
The question now presents itself whether or not the 
petitio principfi fallacy affects the validity of the arqument, 
or .the truth of the premises; or perhaps whether or not it 
affects some other feature of the argument. If the fallacy of 
petitio principii affects the validity of the argument then it 
would be a formal fallacy; and it would follow that no valid 
argument could commit this fallacy and retain its validity. If, 
on the other hand, the petitio principii affects the truth of 
one of the premises, a valid argument could commit this fallacy 
although the argument could never be sound. Another alternative 
28 
An enthymeme is an argument in which one of the premises 
or the conclusion is missing. The argument can be valid or in-
valid. 
still remains in that perhaps even a sound argument can be a 
petitio principii. What is this fallacy, and what is it exactly 
that occurs when this fallacy is committed? 
Circularity in arguments; beqging the question29: 
A begging of the question represents a certain failure to 
demonstrate or prove the proposition which is in need of proof. 30 
Aristotle writes that, " ..•. since we get to know some things 
naturally through themselves and other things by means of some-
thing else .... whenever a man tries to prove what is not self-
evident by means of itself, then he begs the original question. 
This may be done by assuming what is in question at once ..• 1131 
Since a proposition which was self-evident would not require any 
proof, no begging of the question can occur. The question now is 
in what ways a proposition which is not self-evident may be 
offered as proof of itself. 
This may first be done simply by repeating the conclusion 
of an argument as a premise within the same argument. With 
respect to this first way, Aristotle says that, "this is easily 
detected when put in so many words; but it is more apt to es-
cape detection in the case of different terms, or a term and an 
express ion that mean the same thing. 1132 Thus, according to this 
29The. terms "begging the question" and "petitio principi i" 
should be taken in this work to b~ synonymou~. 
30 
Aristotle; -Prior analytics, Book II, Chapter 16 64b,28-29. 
31 
Ibid., 64b, 34-39. 
32--
Aristotle; Topics, Book VII, Chapter 13, 162b, 34-163a. 
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description, the following argument would beg the question or 
commit the fallacy of petitio principii: 
What is handed down to you by your parents is an 
hereditary factor. 
The color of one's eyes is handed down to you by 
four parents. 
he color of one's eyes is an hereditary factor. 33 
If a person who asked for proof of this conclusion were 
offered this syllogism, he might quite readily admit the soundness 
of the argument, but in all likelihood would also respond that 
the conclusion was not really proven; for the minor premise 
and the conclusion are identical. Since by "hereditary factor" 
is meant "a characteristic handed down to you by your parents," 
the minor premise asserts the same thing as the conclusion. They 
each affirm the same state of fact and are the same proposition, 
although their linguistic form is of course different. The minor 
premise is a different sentence than the conclusion, but they 
have the same meaning. The conclusion appears to have been begged 
for it is not self-evident and it is offered as proof of itself. 34 
One problem which exists with the claim that this argument begs 
the question can be put in the form of the following objection: 
since two of the terms used in the argument are really synonymous 
one does not even have a syllogism, though it may appear so on 
the level of linguistic form. Therefore, according to the difference 
This example is used by Kreyche, Loqic for Underqraduates 
(Mew York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1961) p. 280. 
34 
Aristotle; Prior analytic$, Book II, Chapter 16, 65a, 
10-16 and 65a, 19-25. 
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in words which are used, what is presented certainly appears to 
be a syllogism but it is not since it does not have three terms 
each used twice, etc.35 The argument which was presented above 
would not be a syllogism, but a kind of tautology on the level of 
argument.36 The truth of the conclusion follows necessarily 
given the truth of the premises, yet because one premise is 
merely analytic, the truth of the conclusion follows in part 
from the logical necessity proper to all analytic propositions. 
It must be granted that, according to the description of 
a categorical syllogism presented in Chapter One, the argument 
presented above would not be a categorical syllogism, since it 
does not contain three terms. What kind of an argument it -
exactly is is a question which· cannot be fully analyzed in the 
present work. In any case, the argument is certainly not a 
proof. 
A second way an argument may beg the question can be des-
cribed in the following manner. Consider the case in which a 
person presents an argument which is sound, but is then 
· questioned by a second person as to the evidence for the truth 
of one of the premises, for example, the major premise. The 
person who presented the argument has been asked to justify 
This difficulty concerning how a categorical syllogism 
can on the one hand have three terms each used twice, but on the 
.other sometimes commit a petitio .: principii by the conclusion 
merely being repeated as a premise is overlooked by Freeman, 
Lo~ic: The Art of Reasoning (New York: David McKay Co., Inc. 
19 7. Compare p. 145 with p. 290. 
36 
The possibility of a tautology on the level of argument 
was suggested to me by Dr. Josef Seifert. 
:n : 
the truth of one of the premises. Suppose he were now to pre-
sent a second argument in support of the truth of the major 
premise of the first argument, and in this second argument the 
conclusion of the first argument appears as a premise. This is 
precisely what occurs in the following arguments.37 
l ) To accept the authority of Genesis is to accept 
a myth. 
To believe in the doctrine of creation is to accept 
the authoritt of Genesis. 
To believe in the doctrine of Creation is to accept 
a myth. 
2) To believe in the doctrine of creation is to accept 
a myth. 
To accept the authority · of Genesis is to believe in 
the doctrine of creation. 
To accept the authority of Genesis is to accept a 
myth. 
The conclusion of the first argument is used as the major premise 
in the second argument in order to attempt to prove the truth of 
the major premise of the first argument. The major premise of 
the first argument is the conclusion of the second argument, and 
follows necessarily from the premises. In fact both syllogisms 
are sound, but there is no proof involved. There is instead a 
circularity existing between the premises and the conclusions of 
both arguments taken together. A petitio principii is present 
since the conclusion is used as evidence for its own truth, even 
though this occurs indirectly in the form- of two categorical 
syllogisms. The two arguments are each categorical syllogisms 
The following example is used by Freeman, Logic: The Art 
of Reasoning (New York: David McKay Co., Inc. 196,), p. 291. 
so the objection which was raised above does not in this case 
apply. 
It is important to understand that the petitio principii 
fallacy, at least insofar as it has been explained up to this 
point, does not affect either the validity of the argument or 
the truth of the premises. Therefore, a sound argument may 
commit this "mistake" in reasoning. The circularity present 
in a petitio principii affects the possibility of the conclusion 
being proven by the premises. 
A new and different sense of a petitio principii is present 
in the case when a premise is known through a knowledge of the 
conclusion, although it may not be that the only way the premise 
could have been known is by means of the conclusion. Suppose 
then that a person is presented with the following argument: 
All of the people in the room are married. 
All the University faculty are in the room. 
All the University faculty are married. 
Suppose further that by chance he comes to know that all of the 
people in the room are married by asking each of the faculty 
members if they are married, as well as the other persons in the 
room. In this case, the major premise is known by means of the 
conclusion and a circularity is created between the conclusion 
as following from the premises and how one of the prem{ses is 
known. This does not mean that one of the premises could only 
be known by means of the conclusion, but only that in this case 
a premise cannot be used by a person as evidence for a conclusion 
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since it was by means of the conclusion that he knew the pre-
mise. 
These are two ways in which a conclusion may be used as 
evidence for the truth of one of the premises. What is present-
ly at issue is whether or not the dependency which exists 
between the premises and the conclusion of a categorical syllo-
gism when the propositions are contingent amounts to a begging 
of the question. The possibility · certainly exists since the 
propositions are contingent and not self-evident as they would 
be if they were essentially necessary. However, it is not as if 
the conclusion actually appears as a pcemise in a way which 
would make the propositions identical, nor is it necessary that 
the conclusion actually be offered as evidence for the truth of 
either one of the premises. What is in fact the case is that 
the premises presuppose the truth of the conclusion in the way 
it was explained above. The question then is whether or not 
this presupposition amounts to the conclusion being an implicit 
premise of the syllogism such that it is a case of an attempt to 
prove that which is not self-evident by means of itself. 
Presuppositions and arguments: 
Insofar as various laws such as the law of non-contradiction 
and the law of identity are presupposed by everything which in any 
sense "is," all arguments presuppose them. The concepts found in 
the propositions constituting the argument, the propositions 
themselves, their truth, the validity of the argument, etc., all 
presuppose the law of non-contradiction and the law of identity. 
However, these presuppositions which are present even if the 
syllogism is an actual proof do not appear as premises in the 
proof itself. No one would claim that there is a petitio 
principii simply because there is a presupposition to the proof. 
But what if that which is presupposed is the conclusion, as it 
is in the example under discussion? The argument certainly cannot 
be a proof, but from this it does not follow that it is a 
petitio principii. 
In the case of a sound categorical syllogism with premises 
that are contingent, the soundness of the syllogism presupposes 
the truth of the conclusion, not in the trivial sense that it 
must be true, as mast also the premises, if the syllogism is to 
be sound; but in the sense that the truth of each of the premises 
presupposes the truth of the conclusion in a way that any uncertain-
ty about the conclusion extends also to 'the premises. The truth 
of the premises follows from the truth of the conclusion in the 
sense that the truth of the contingent propositions follows be-
cause the particular instances possess what is affirmed by the 
predicate, and at least some of these same particular instances 
are referred to by the conclusion. The truth of the conclusion is 
therefore in this way presupposed by the premises. The conclusion, 
in its capacity as a presupposition for the soundness of the 
syllogism, since its truth is presupposed for the truth of the 
premises, therefore contributes to the truth of the premises in 
particular and to the soundness of the syllogism in general. The 
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conclusion does not appear explicitly as a premise in the syllo-
gism although its truth is presupposed by each of the premises; 
and therefore when the true premises are offered as evidence 
for the conclusion it is difficult not to conclude that there is 
an attempt to prove the truth of the conclusion by means of 
itself. 
For example, consider that when a person is presented 
with a valid syllogism this person asks for proof of the fact 
that it is valid. Suppose further that the person who presented 
the argument offers a second syllogism of the same form with a 
conclusion affirming the validity of the first syllogism. He 
would undoubtedly corrmit a petitio principii even though the 
conclusion does not appear explicitly as a premise in the syllo-
-gism. The truth of the conclusion is nevertheless still pre-
supposed, but not for the actual truth of either of the premises. 
It is rather that the validity of the form of the syllogism is 
asserted by the conclusion of the argument having the same valid 
form. The conclusion is in this sense an implicit premise in the 
syllogism, for its truth is presupposed in the very attempt to 
prove its truth. 
The same appears true in the case of a syllogism with 
contingent premises. The conclusion does not appear as an actual 
premise in the argument, but there is a dependency of the truth 
of the premises on the truth of the conclusion. Any uncertainty 
about the truth of the conclusion extends also to the premises. 
This would seem to mean that the conclusion is an implicit 
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premise in the syllggism, for its truth is presupposed in the 
attempt of the premises to prove its truth. 
This seems to amount to the accusation that all categorical 
syllogisms with contingent propositions commit the fallacy of 
petitio principii. A final judgement can only be made if a 
more detailed explanation is given on the precise nature of a 
petitio principii. The conventional use of the term itself of 
course plays a decisive role. What certainly can be concluded 
is that the presupposition of the truth of the premises on the 
truth of the conclusion due to their contingent character re-
presents no proof of the conclusion. What will now be shown 
is how a syllogism wit~ premises that are essentially necessary 
is an actual proof of the truth of the conclusion. 
An actual proof: 
When the premises of a valid syllogism are essentially 
necessary propositions, the truth of the conclusion is proven 
by the truth of the premises by way of the valid form of the 
argument. Since the premises are essentially necessary, their 
truth does not follow from each particular instance having the 
predicate. The proposition does not even explicitly refer to 
any particular instances, and is true even if no particular 
instances exist or will ever exist. Because of the essential 
necessity of the proposition, if a particular instance does 
exist, then it must necessarily possess the predicate. The 
truth of the proposition, however, does not depend on the 
existence of any particular instances. In an essentially 
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necessary proposition, the object referred to by the subject 
concept may or may not be embodied in a particular instance; by 
a particular being having a contingent existence. If a particu-
lar contingent being did exist which possessed in its essence 
what was referred to by the essentially necessary proposition, 
then the being which has a contingent existence would neverthe-
less possess something in its essence necessarily. Thus, the 
essentially necessary proposition, ''A mortal being is not the · 
cause of its own existence," is true even if no mortal beings 
exist. If a mortal being does exist, then it will belong 
necessarily to its essence that it was not the cause of its own 
existence; it will belong necessarily to its mortality that 
it was not the cause of its own existence. 
The following syllogism is an example of a proof: 
A value response can be given only be a being capable 
of cognitive acts. 
Love is a value response. 
Love can only be given by a being capable of cognitive 
acts. 
In this syllogism, the truth of each of the premises does not 
depend on the existence of any particular instances. The 
premises are true even if no beings caoable of cognitive acts 
exist or if no beings giving the value response of love exist; 
for the premises refer to the nature or essence of love and to 
the essence of a value response. Their truth does not follow 
from the fact that particular instances have what is affirmed 
by the predicate as it would if the premises were contingent. 
Thus, in this syllogism the truth 6f each of the premises 
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does not depend on the truth of the conclusion as it did in the 
case of a syllogism with contingent premises. The truth of 
the conclusion is instead proven by the truth of the premises; 
from their truth the truth of the conclusion necessarily follows 
and is itself essentially necessary since its truth was proven 
by premises which were themselves essentially necessary. 
Proofs and sound arguments: 
The lack of probative force in categorical syllogisms 
which are constituted by contingent propositions may be described 
in the following manner. When in a proposition, the predicate 
does not belong necessarily to the subject, the fact that it 
does belong to the subject will derend upon the fact that each 
instance of_ what it affirms in fact has what the predicate refers 
to. However, the conclusion of a valid categorical syllogism 
with contingent premises refers to at least some of the same 
instances on which the truth of each of the premises depends. 
For this reason, any uncertainty about the truth of the conclusion 
must extend also to the premises. Furthermore, in this way, the 
truth of the premises need the truth of the concluion for their 
own truth; they depend upon the truth of the conclusion. The 
premises, therefore, cannot by their truth prove the truth of 
the conclusion since the truth of the conclusion would already be 
presupposed if they were true. 
However, in the case of a categorical syllogism constituted 
by essentially necessary propositions no such dependency between 
the premises and the conclusion exists. Since the predicate of 
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the proposition belongs to the subject necessarily that which 
makes for the truth of the proposition is entirely different 
with respect to each of the premises and the conclusion. Using 
the example of a proof just presented above, it is because of 
the very nature of a value response that it presupposes a cogni-
tive act; the cognitive act by which the value is apprehended. 
Similarly it is because of the essence of what love is that 
makes for its being a value response. In each of these cases 
the predicate is intelligibly grounded in the nature of the 
subject, and therefore their truth does not follow from the fact 
that love presupposes a cognitive act. The distinctness of each 
of the affirmed states of fact does not exist in the case of con-
tingent propositions. When the latter comprise a categorical 
syllogism, the states of fact affirmed are more closely re.lated 
due to the commonality existing between them since they refer to 
at least some of the same particular instances. Because the 
predicate is not intelligibly grounded in the subject, its 
truth follows from the fact that the particular instances have 
what the proposition affirms they have. But at least some of 
the same particular instances are referred to by both ·premises 
and the conclusion and therefore their truth is not distinct from 
each other like in the case of essentially necessary propositions. 
This lack of distinctness in syllogisms comprised by con-
tingent propositions may be reflected in the way the truth of 
the premises is known, just as the presence of this distinctness 
may be reflected in the way the truth of essentially necessary 
premises is known. But. the question of this distinctness is 
ultimately a metaphysical one grounded in the nature of the state 
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of fact the proposition affirms, and this will always be reflect-
ed in the question of the probative force of the premises. 38 
8 
The problem of whether or not a conclusion can be proven 
in a way other tha_n the premises being essentially necessary 
is a question which cannot be presently investigated. 
CH.~PTER FOUR 
MILL AND PFANDER EEXAMINED 
Since an investigation has been made into the issues and 
problems raised by Mill and Pfander, their views can now be re-
examined. Any praise or criticism which can be made aqainst 
either of them must rest on a foundation established by lookinq 
at reality itself. It is insiqnific~nt to criticize an author 
merely for beinq inconsistent when one· of his positions is the 
correct one; and it is ludicrous to praise a writer for beinq 
consistent when his entire system is not adequate to reality. 
This brief critique of Mill and Pfander will therefore not consist 
of an attempt to merely point out internal inconsistencies within 
each of their positions. Instead, each of their positions will be 
compared and contrasted with the results achieved in Chapter 
Three. 
On Mi 11: 
Mill is certainly correct to the extent of revealinq that 
some arguments represent no proof of the conclusion. Mill extended 
this to all arguments and is in this respect in· error; 
arguments actually prove the truth of the conclusion. 
for some 
Further, the 
evidence which Mill furnishes in support of his accusation against 
the probative force of the syllogism is suspect for the followinq 
reasons. 
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Mill's explanation of validity, which is the foundation of 
his claim regarding the petitio princioii, does not in fact 
support the kind of presupposition he claims exists between the 
conclusion and the major premise. There is certainly a sense in 
which the conclusion of a valid argument is contained in the 
premises for otherwise the argument would be invalid. In other 
words, since the conclusion of a valid arqument cannot assert 
more than can be concluded with necessity from the premises one 
can say that the conclusion is found in the premises. This sense 
in which one says that the conclusion is contained in the premises 
certainly is not the same as when the conclusion of an araument is 
repeated as a premise wh1ch is one example of the petitio 
printipii . Within the context of validity in cateqorical sylloqisms 
the minor term appears in one of the premises and the major-term 
appears in the other remaining premise. The minor term and the 
major term are united, so to speak, by means of the middle term, 
which allows one to conclude that the major term belongs to the 
minor terms, as long as the argument is valid. The conclusion of 
a valid argument is in this sense contained in both of the premises. 
However, Mill claims that in the syllo0ism he presented, the con-
clusion was presupposed in the major premise, but this does not 
follow from the meaning of validity . By the validity of the arqu-
ment, the conclusion is contained in the premises taken toqether 
and not in only one of the premises. This is true whether the 
syllogism is a proof or not, and follows only from the validity of 
the argument. In a valid argument, the conclusion is as much 
contained in one premise as the other, thou~h it is more correct 
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to speak of the conclusion contained in both premises toqether. 
Therefore, it is not possib1e for Mill to assert that the con-
clusion of the syllogism he presents is contained in the major 
premise based on the notion of validity. If the conclusion is 
contained in the major premise it must do so for some other 
reason which Mill does not mention in the passaqe quoted. 
From this it also follows that Mill's accusation of a 
petitio ·principii cannot rest solely on the notion of validity. 
The sense in which the conclusion of a valid argument i~ contained 
in the premises does not at all constitute a beqging of the 
question. 
Two further points against Mill can also be made. The first 
concerns in what sense the conclusion of the sylloqism he presents 
can be presupposed in the major premise. The conclusion cannot be 
contained in a way that would allow one to infer by way of 
immediate inference the truth of the conclusion from the truth of 
the premise. From the premise, "All men are mortal , 11 it does not 
follow ·that, "Socrates is mortal. 11 It must also be established 
that Socrates is a man. Without the latter included as a premise 
the conclusion cannot be inferred. Therefore, the conclusion is 
not contained in the major premise in the way it would if the con-
clusion could be inferred iMIT1edi'ately. A second point which must 
be made is that it is clear that in some syllogisms the conclusion 
is not contained in the major premise. In the syllogism, 
Some inhabitants of Texas are inhabitants of the 
United States 
All -the inhabitants of Texas are inhabitants of 
North America· 
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Some inhabitants of the United States are 
i nhabi tan ts of North. Jlmeri ca. 
the conclusion is not presupposed by the major premise in the way 
Mill described. It is true that Mill uses in his attack only one 
particular form of a categorical sylloqism, and it is clear that 
he would extend his accusation to every valid form of cateqorical 
sylloqism. . The above example would, therefore, show that the 
conclusion cannot be contained in the major premise in every case. 
Yet, could Mill say that it was included in the minor premise? 
Another difficulty which also presents itself is that Mill uses in 
the syllogism he presents singular propositions. A singular propo-
sition refers to one particular instance. A final remark can be 
made regarding these problems. 
It seems that Mill confuses two ways in which one can speak 
of the sylloqism being a deductive argument proceeding from general 
to particular. The first sense would apply to the notion of 
validity in a way already explained. The conclusion of a valid ar-
gument, insofar as it does not go beyond the premises cannot 
possess more generality than the premises. A second sense is also 
one explained in detail and applies to the way a proposition may be 
said to depend on existing particular instances. The conclusion of 
a syllogism need not at all refer to a particular instance or some 
particular instances which are referred to by the major premise. 
Mill's use of singular propositions certainly suggests that he would 
be of the latter opinion. 
This brings one to the question of whether or not the 
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presupposition which Mill had in mind between the conclusion 
and the major premise is the same as the one explained in 
Chapter Three re~arding contingent propositions. If so, Mill 
is incorrect in maintaining that such a presupposition is 
present only between the conclusion a.nd the major premise. Both 
premises would be involved. Furthermore, Mill would fail to 
see that his accusation does not apply to all syllogisms. This 
failure may rest on certain metaphysical beliefs which would 
preclude the possibility of essentiaily necessary states of 
fact. 
A final judgement would involve a more extensive examination 
of his entire works which cannot presently be undertaken. 
Ori.Pfander: 
It is of course clear that the results of the investigation 
made into the question of the probative force of the syllogism 
. . 
come much closer to the views of Pf'ander than they did in the case 
of Mill. Pf'ander's distinction between a relationship of truth and 
a relationship of proof can certainly apply to arguments which are 
sound but which contain contingent propositions and proofs con- _ 
taining essentially necessary propositions. The distinction which 
Pfander made between collective inductive universal judgements and 
proving deductive universal is similar though not identical to the 
distinction between contingent and necessary propositions. For 
Pfander, an essentially necessary proposition would represent one 
kind of proving deductive universal judgement. Nevertheless, 
Pfander would ce_rtainly a~ree that any sylloqisrn containing 
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essentially necessary propositions was in fact a proof of the 
conclusion. However, the followinq criticism must be made not 
unrelated to this point. 
Pfander agrees with Mill that in some cases the conclusion 
of an argument is included in the more universal premise. To 
this extent the same criticism of Mill applies also to Pf°ander. 
In Pfander1 s example, the premise, 11All the windows of the house 
are open,11 is said to include the conclusion, 11The studio window 
of the house is open.11 Yet, if this were so, one would be able 
to conclude from the premise the truth of the conclusion; but 
this cannot be done. Pfander's argument is not an immediate in-
ference for the simple reason that there is no certainty that 
the house has a studio window. From the premise that all the 
windows of the house are open, one can conclude that some or at 
least one of the windows is open, but not that the studio window 
is open; for how is one to know that the house even has a studio 
window. 
Since Pfander claims that the conclusion is included in the 
premise, he also maintains that the truth of the premise pre-
supposes the truth of the conclusion. From this it follows that 
there is no proof, which is the same conclusjon that was reached 
regarding arguments with contingent premises. Apparently however, 
the explanation behind each view is different. When the premises 
are contingent the truth of the premises presupposes the truth of 
the conclusion because at least some of the particular instances 
on which the truth of each depends are the same. But this does 
not mean the conclusion is included in one of the premises. The 
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truth of each of the premises in a syllogism presuppose the truth 
of the conclusion whenever the premises are continqent. The con-
clusion is contained in the premises of any syllogism which is 
valid and this would apply to a relationship of proof. There is 
not a sense in which the conclusion is contained in only one 
premise of a syllogism. Accordinq to the validity of the syllo-
gism, the conclusion is contained in the premises taken together, 
and if the premises are contingent, each of the premises presupposes 
the truth of the conclusion. 
These precedinq remarks must suffice as a critique of 
Pfander and Mill. It is hoped that thejr insiqhts have been separa-
·-
ted from their errors, and that this entire investiqation has done 
justice to reality; for the separation of truth from error is 
possible only if reality is the final judge. 
69 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Aristotle. The Works of Aristotle. Oxford Univ. Press, 1950. 
Copi, Irving M. Introduction to Loqic. New York: Oxford 
Univ. Press, 1972. 
Freeman, David H. Logic: The Art of Reasonino. New York: 
David McKay Co., Inc. ,796-r.- -
Hamblin, C.L. Fallacies. London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 
1970. 
Kreyche, R.J. Logic for Undergraduates. New York: Holt, 
Rinehart & Winston, 1961. 
Mill, John Stuart. A System of Loqic. 2 vols. London: 
Longams, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1872. 
Pfander, Alexander. Loqik. Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlaq~ 
1963. 
Young, William. Foundations of Theory. New Jersey: Craig 
Press, 1967. 
70 
